Manual British Strategy and Intelligence in the Suez Crisis

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Suez Deconstructed offers a vivid sense of how difficult it is for policymakers to step back from their own experiences, let alone embody the perspectives of their counterparts. It is a rare quality in world leaders to be able to make historical analogies without fully embracing them, thereby becoming trapped.

Together, these elements suggest that statecraft, particularly in a crisis, is not an entirely rational pursuit. For much of the past 70 years, the wars most prominent in the American imagination have been nuclear standoffs and insurgent street fights.

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The wars of the coming decades, however, are likely to look more like Suez than Berlin or Iraq. They will likely be multi-state conflicts, in which states of every size and strength play major roles. These contests will be byzantine. Like Suez, they will be local skirmishes and global crises simultaneously. Such conflicts have already begun to emerge, and policymakers have largely failed to adjust.

In Syria, for example, two great powers the United States and Russia and three regional powers Israel, Iran, and Turkey , as well as a paramilitary terrorist organization, Hezbollah, have vied for influence in the midst of a failed state, wracked by civil war, with myriad factions and a lingering Islamic caliphate. In East Asia, meanwhile, claims over islands in the South China Sea could spark a multi-power war in a global economic hinge point — one that could quickly draw in the United States.

These conflicts have not become worldwide conflagrations despite, in the case of Syria, the unimaginable toll on Syrians themselves. To navigate this environment, policymakers will need to grapple with everything from budgetary constraints to new forms of power projection.

The Other Side of Suez (BBC Documentary)

But at bottom, they will need to recall the elements that have long moved leaders and nations, but have recently been forgotten: pride and emotion, personality and temperament, context and history. Image: U. Navy photo. The Suez Crisis and the Fog of Diplomacy. Jordan Chandler Hirsch.

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In Suez Deconstructed , Philip Zelikow, the late Ernest May, and a team of scholars set out to provide students and foreign policy practitioners with a practical guide to navigating the complexities and uncertainties of international diplomacy. Further complicating matters, the crisis was directly linked to regional conflicts in the Middle East, especially the Arab-Israeli dispute; occurred early on in the nuclear age; contributed greatly to the eventual collapse of European colonial empires; and forced policymakers to operate in conditions of deep uncertainty.

This whole approach is certainly both novel and creative, a point on which the three reviewers in this roundtable, Jordan Hirsch, Madison Schramm, and Danny Steed, are agreed. Thus, both Hirsch and Schramm specifically refer to the war in Syria and potential conflicts over the South China Sea as scenarios where Suez Deconstructed could provide a useful lens. The reviewers, of course, found a few aspects of the book worthy of criticism and did not view its key takeaways exactly the same way.

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For his part, Hirsch identifies two significant takeaways from the book. Similarly, he writes, the personal relationship between British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and the American secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, hamstrung the policies being pursued by the Western powers.

British Strategy and Intelligence in the Suez Crisis -

Perhaps most importantly, Hirsch notes that many of the key decision-makers during the crisis were influenced to a considerable degree by their experiences from the s and the road to World War II. The reviewers rightly emphasize a number of valuable insights from Suez Deconstructed , but I see two key takeaways from the book that are somewhat different. The first has to do with methodology, and here the reviews by Steed and Hirsch provide helpful insights. Although, they observe, the book is extremely rich in historical detail and offers a new approach to learning about decision-making, there is something quite odd about it: Suez Deconstructed provides no explicit argument or set of arguments for readers.

But few of them help readers understand how to do it, so the skills do not necessarily advance.

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  • Consult with others. This sort of approach, however, is problematic. But for a book whose main objective is to serve as a guide to the practice of statecraft, it is quite puzzling that readers are left without much guidance as to what one should take away from the whole Suez story. The job of scholars, of course, is to make sense of the complex issues they study, such that the key insights derived from their analysis are clearly and logically spelled out. In this respect, the authors might have capitalized more effectively on their innovative approach by integrating some of the methods that international relations scholars employ to study these sorts of issues into their analysis.

    Zelikow, however, explicitly rejects that way of studying statecraft. Only some of the more eccentric entomologists write how-to manuals to guide the ants. After all, when making decisions, policymakers are, in effect, relying on theoretical frameworks about how the world operates. And it is precisely in the realm of theory and in the formulation of generalizable knowledge that political scientists and international relations scholars have the most to offer.

    The same could be said for the way in which some decision-makers involved in the crisis interpreted the intelligence available to them. This, again, is an area where political scientists have provided important insights, ones that could help elucidate these sorts of problems and underline their significance to readers seeking policy-relevant knowledge.

    The point here is not to criticize the historical approach the book takes.

    In fact, that sort of approach can be extremely valuable. Instead, it is to highlight a missed opportunity for the authors to provide readers with more concrete policy takeaways. To be sure, there are real limits to what one can learn from studying something in a completely abstract way. But the analysis should not simply stop there.